The Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), a brainchild of Elon Musk, is once again under scrutiny after it was revealed that two of its members were on confidential networks for days with critical information about the United States’ nuclear arsenal, according to NPR.
Luke Farritor, a 23-year-old former SpaceX intern, and Adam Ramada, an investor with no experience in defense or intelligence, were identified in network access directories used by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Department of Defense. Their inclusion has raised concerns among experts and officials.
Two DOGE employees have access to a network used to transmit classified nuclear weapons data and a separate network used by the Department of Defense, sources tell NPR.https://t.co/iAsLitpLpr pic.twitter.com/ZIVZGbGMwj
— WKNO-FM | Public Radio for the Mid-South (@WKNOFM) May 1, 2025The affected systems, the NNSA Enterprise Secure Network and SIPRNet, are used to share restricted and classified data related to the design, maintenance, and coordination of nuclear warheads.
The creation of accounts for these two employees—who did not have a “Q” clearance, the Department of Energy’s highest level of security—was initially denied by the agency but was later acknowledged, although the agency asserted that the accounts were “never used.”
National security experts warn that listing in these directories is a first step toward requesting subsequent authorisations. As a former Department of Defense official explained, access is granted on a need-to-know basis, but having active credentials opens the door to deeper penetration into the systems.
This case adds to other controversial episodes involving the DOGE team. In February, the attempted dismissal of 350 NNSA technicians, many of them directly linked to nuclear weapons assembly, was partially reversed due to political and media pressure.
At the same time, allegations of unauthorised access to internal systems of the National Labor Relations Board emerged, where DOGE members reportedly requested that their movements be concealed and traces of their activity be eliminated.
One of the most alarming incidents was an attempted connection from a Russian IP address using DOGE-generated credentials, which triggered immediate alerts across various government departments. This series of incidents has called into question the operational legitimacy of an agency that, despite its powers, lacks clear democratic oversight mechanisms.
Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project, warns that even unclassified budgets include sensitive technical references.
“I don’t think any of that is open,” he noted, highlighting the seriousness of allowing access to unqualified actors. For Kristensen, the risk lies not only in the content that could be accessed, but in the precedent it creates.